

PUBLIC OPINION ON THE FORMATION OF THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY IN THREE ASEAN COUNTRIES

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ABSTRACT

In 1997, 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states envisaged an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) with free flows of goods, services and investments, and freer flows of capital features. In contrast to the process of establishing economic integration in the European Union, the process in ASEAN has never directly engaged the public. This study aims to gauge public opinion on the AEC through a survey research conducted in 11 major cities in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. It investigates the extent of public attitudes and aspirations in four dimensions—support, commitment, perceived benefits and aspiration—among the public in the three countries. Survey results show that the attitudes of the public were positive, but there were differences in the extent of support, commitment and perceived benefits. The study also finds that they seem to aspire for a different kind of integration from the European format of regional integration. In addition, comparison statistics showed that the Malaysian and Indonesian public exhibited more positive attitude and higher aspiration for economic integration. The finding implies that the ASEAN Secretariat—together with national governments—needs to formulate effective strategies to maintain positive attitudes and support for the integration initiatives. It further suggests that ASEAN should continuously monitor public opinion on the region's economic integration and develop strategies for fostering and maintaining good support from the public for further deepening the economic integration process.

Keywords: ASEAN economic community, regionalism, public opinion survey, public attitude, public aspiration

INTRODUCTION

Regional integration is perhaps the most notable and consequential feature of the international economic and political landscape to take shape since the end of the Cold War (Devlin and Estevadeordal 2011; Jupille and Jolliff 2011; Kupchan 1996; Weiss 1999). As a worldwide phenomenon of increased interaction between actors (state and non-state) in economic, security, political, social and cultural issues (Frost 2008; Van Ginkel and Van Langenhove 2003; De Lombaerde and Van Langenhove 2007), regional integration has emerged in different stages in various parts of the world, with its most developed form in the European Union (EU).

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is regarded as one of the most successful regional integration initiatives among the developing countries. Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has been successful in maintaining political stability and security that has in part contributed towards the rapid economic growth of its five founding members during 1960s–1990s.¹ Although its *raison d'être* was political—to secure the region's peace, stability and development—its aims include the promotion of regional economic, social and cultural cooperation among the five founding countries of Southeast Asia (Tan 2004: 935).

The subsequent advent of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997 and increasing competition for investment flows from a rising China and India caused the regional leaders to realign their strategy for ASEAN economic integration. Accordingly, they adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020 in December 1997 that envisaged "a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN Economic Region in which there is a free flow of goods, services and investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities" by the year 2020 (ASEAN Secretariat 1997). Subsequently, a founding document of the ASEAN Community—the Declaration of Bali Concord II—in 2003 made the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as its new goal in economic integration (ASEAN Secretariat 2003). Later, the 12th ASEAN Summit accelerated the deadline of the AEC establishment to 2015 (ASEAN Secretariat 2007). In 2007, the lofty goals of the AEC were translated into action when the ASEAN Leaders issued the Declaration on the AEC Blueprint. The Blueprint is essentially a master plan formulated for guiding the achievement of an AEC by 2015 by means of detailing

economic integration measures, commitment, targets and timelines for their implementation into four pillars, namely, a single market and production base, a competitive economic region, equitable economic development and full integration into the global economy (ASEAN Secretariat 2009).

As the deadline for the AEC looms ahead in 2015, there are numerous studies that have assessed the achievements and challenges for AEC (Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, ERIA 2012; Asian Development Bank Institute, ADBI 2012). While these reviews indicate that there has been some success in achieving some of the goals of the Blueprint, economic integration is still very much work in progress or the AEC is still essentially a community in the making, when measured against its stated goals. Moreover, despite a plethora of summits, meetings, plans and protocols designed both to strengthen economic integration in the region, the AEC is essentially a top-down initiative for establishing a single market and production base. The general public of member countries has never been involved in the building process of the ASEAN Community and the AEC (Benny and Abdullah 2011; Chavez 2007; Moorthy and Benny 2012a and 2012b; Sutherland 2009).

It is arguable that realising the AEC as in the case of the other pillars of the ASEAN community requires also a bottom-up approach as a community cannot be built without engaging the interests of the public, be it the private sector or ordinary ASEAN people (Tham et al. 2008; Das 2012; Ramos 2013). Public opinion and perceptions held by the people living in a region can affect the outcomes of regional integration in subtle ways as negative perceptions can lead to a general lack of support for economic integration as has been the case in the South Asian countries (Priyanka 2012). Indeed, public involvement is crucial as history suggests the public as one of key agents in establishing other regional initiatives such as the EU. The three traditions of regional integration theories—transactionalist, neo-functional and democratic theory—have shown that opinions and participation of the general public would determine the success of such efforts (Abdullah and Benny 2013; Collins 2008; Hewstone 1986; Moorthy and Benny 2012a and 2012b). Therefore, public opinion needs to be gauged and attended to for the success of the integration and for making effective decisions that can satisfy the needs and wants of the public. Several scholars have argued that positive public attitudes, opinions and aspiration are important for regional integration. Wilson (2004) argues that one of the major barriers to regional integration in North America is the lack of public support for closer integration. Similarly, Gabel (1998) asserts that public attitudes are an important component of European integration because they provide the political foundation for integration as well as shape and

constrain the process of the integration. Gabel further argues that the endurance of the political system in the EU vitally depends on public compliance with and acceptance of EU law which lacks a supranational means of enforcement. Similarly, Jones (2009) also contends that public attitudes are important both for the euro and the European Central Bank because of the problem of legitimacy in regional financial policy. Furthermore, the persistent work of Eurobarometer—that have assessed public attitudes, opinions and aspirations towards European regional integration for more than 38 years—shows us the importance of assessing public attitudes, opinions and aspirations. The current status and success of EU in economic, political and social integration have clearly been the outcome of consensus, active mutually-constitutive involvement of the public and policies based on the *Eurobarometer* surveys on the grassroots. Even prior to the realisation and formalisation of the EU, policy makers and academicians had conducted extensive studies to determine the understanding and acceptance of the idea of a regional community of the European public.

Currently, there is a notable absence of studies attempting to capture public voices on an AEC. Studies on the ASEAN are numerous, yet these studies were conducted on or by government officials and academics using the elite decision-making approach for assessing the establishment processes or the social, political and economic challenges of ASEAN (Acharya 2003; Hew, Wah and Lee 2004; Hew 2007; Guerrero 2008) as well as the readiness of the business sector for the AEC (Abidin et al. 2012; Mugijayani and Kartika 2012). Studies on public opinion of ASEAN are quite rare. There has been only a few studies so far on the subject (see Benny et al. 2014; Abdullah and Benny 2013; Benny and Abdullah 2011; Moorthy and Benny 2013, 2012a and 2012b; Thompson and Thianthai 2008), but none of those study discusses about public attitudes and aspiration for the AEC.

This study is aimed to gauge public opinion on the AEC through a survey conducted in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. These three countries are chosen for three main reasons: first, they are among the founding members of ASEAN, besides Thailand and the Philippines. For this reason, it is expected that the public in these countries would exhibit a better understanding and knowledge of ASEAN than those in the newer member countries. Second, these three countries are considered pivotal in ASEAN in terms of size of territory, population and economy. In 2010, the three countries accounted for 49.40 percent of the land mass of ASEAN, 44.80 percent of the regional population, 62.90 percent of the regional Gross Domestic Product, 66.30 percent of trade, and attracted 76.10 percent of

foreign direct investments in ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat 2012).² Third, the three countries have maintained close political, economic and socio-cultural relationships and interdependence both at the governmental and people-to-people levels. This study will contribute significantly to the ASEAN regional initiatives because ASEAN is an elitist as well as a state-centric organisation (Acharya 2003 and 2009; Benny and Abdullah 2011; Chavez 2007; Sutherland 2009; Moorthy and Benny 2013, 2012a and 2012b). Thus, by highlighting the importance of public opinion survey in providing information on the opinion of the grassroots on regionalism initiatives, this study may contribute as a call for ASEAN leaders to be more attentive to the opinion of the public.

THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

The Bali Concord II clearly stated economic regionalism as the second pillar of ASEAN Community, together with the political security and socio-cultural community (ASEAN Secretariat 2003). Historically, state-promoted economic integration is often the most common form of regionalism where government and business interests pursue economic integration (this can differ in terms of depth or sectoral scope) in order to promote trade liberalisation and economic growth (Hurrell 1995).

Regarding the concept of "Economic Communities," review on literatures found no specific definition of it despite the many kinds of economic integration. In economics, the concept of an economic community is usually discussed within the context of regional integration, where a collection of autarkical economies evolves to become an integrated economic unit (Tham 2008: 36). Accordingly, an economic community may take the form of a Free Trade Area (FTA) like in the ASEAN Free Trade Area Agreement (AFTA) in 1992; a Custom Union (CU) like in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); a Common Market (CM) like in the European Economic Area (EEA); an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) like in the EU; or an Economic and Political Union (EPU) like in the U.S. (Dent 2002; Jovanovic 2006; Pelkmans 2001).

While there are several theoretical types of Economic Community, AEC is modelled as an FTA-Plus economic community, which includes some elements of a common market, but does not include the common external tariff (CET) (Guerrero 2008). The model is chosen due to the different degree of openness and stages of economic development among its members. The AEC Blueprint emphasises the importance of external trade

to ASEAN and the need for the regional framework to remain outward looking (ASEAN Secretariat 2009). It is stated that AEC envisages four key goals: (a) a single market and production base; (b) a highly competitive economic region; (c) a region of equitable economic development; and (d) a region fully integrated into the global economy.

SURVEY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

The study utilises the result of public opinion survey gathered information on public attitudes, opinions and aspirations for AEC in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore between June and December 2010. To measure the response, the survey used a set of questionnaire with 5-likert scale questions (Christensen et al. 2011: 349). The questions were developed to examine four dimensions of public attitudes and aspirations by combining the concept of support, commitment, perceived benefits and aspiration for regional integration in Eurobarometer studies (Directorate-General for Communication of the European Commission 1974–2010) with the features of AEC in the Bali Concord II (ASEAN Secretariat 2003) and the AEC Blueprint (ASEAN Secretariat 2009). The list of questions used in the questionnaire is presented in the Appendix section. The questions were available in three national languages, namely Bahasa Indonesia, Bahasa Malaysia and English and pretested to a number of 30 respondents for each type of questionnaire to ensure the coherence of the survey instrument.

In the three countries, the survey was held in 11 major cities (Indonesia: Jakarta, Makassar, Medan, Surabaya and Pontianak; Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Melaka, Johor Bahru and Kota Kinabalu; and Singapore). The cities were purposively chosen in terms of their significance to the economy, polity and socio-culture of the countries and their connectedness to other countries in the region (Moorthy and Benny 2012: 1047). One or two most leading universities in each city were chosen to gather the data—so some of the respondents came from Universitas Indonesia (Jakarta), Universitas Hasanuddin (Makassar), Universitas Sumatera Utara (Medan), Universitas Airlangga and Institut Teknologi Sepuluh November (Surabaya), Universitas Tanjungpura (Pontianak), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and Universiti Malaya (Kuala Lumpur), Universiti Sains Malaysia (Penang), Universiti Teknikal Malaysia (Melaka), Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (Johor Bahru), Universiti Malaysia Sabah (Kota Kinabalu), National University of Singapore, Nanyang Technological University and Singapore Management University (Singapore).

The survey was carried out between June and December 2010, involving 551 Indonesians, 451 Malaysians and 294 Singaporeans; therefore a total of 1,256 respondents were involved in the study. They were selected by purposive—quota sampling (Burnham et al. 2008: 106–107), balancing the proportion of students and staffs respondents in the university, and the background of education—business, engineering, sciences and social sciences. The research plan necessitated respondents with a minimum of university education background in order to get more valid responses because the questions asked were considered to be complicated and required more critical thinking to answer. The choice of the respondents was thought to reflect the reality of them who will be active in the establishment of the ASEAN Community.

Data from the survey were analysed using statistical methods. Firstly, univariate descriptive statistics, such as percentage, mode and mean were used to describe the statistical profiles of each variable. To ease the analysis of frequency distribution, the 5-likert scale responses were regrouped into three response-categories. In this sense, those who disagree to the statement were combined with those who completely disagree. Similarly, those who agree to the statement were combined with those who completely agree. Finally, to compare the responses from the three countries, the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests and Post-Hoc Least-Square Difference (Post-Hoc LSD) tests were used for the indicators of support, commitment and perceived benefits (Christensen et al. 2011: 441–444). In order to compare the distribution of nominal categorical data of aspiration indicators, the study used Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests.

Table 1 shows the profile of the respondents involved in the survey. Those surveyed consisted of 50.8 percent male and 49.2 percent female respondents. The majority of them are younger mature (75.4 percent), single (70.7 percent), with undergraduate education background (72.4 percent) and lower to middle level of household expenditure. Students (46.2 percent), lecturers (21.9 percent) and private-sector employees (15.1 percent) were three major occupations of respondents in the three countries.

Table 1: Respondent profile.

		Countries					
		Indonesia		Malaysia		Singapore	Overall
Number of the respondents		511		451		294	1,256
Cities of domicile		Jakarta	37.1	Kuala Lumpur	27.7		
		Medan	15.7	Melaka	20.6		
		Surabaya	15.7	Penang	19.3	Singapore	100
		Pontianak	15.7	Johor Bahru	17.5		–
		Makassar	15.9	Kota Kinabalu	14.9		
Gender	Male	48.0		51.1		55.5	50.8
	Female	52.0		48.9		44.5	49.2
Age (years old)	Younger mature (18 to 34)	83.8		73.1		63.7	75.4
	Older mature (35 to 49)	13.4		20.9		22.0	18.1
	Senior (50 or more)	2.8		6.0		14.3	6.5
Marital status	Single	74.6		70.7		63.6	70.7
	Married	25.2		28.2		35.7	28.6
	Widow/er	0.2		1.1		.7	0.7
Formal education	Under-graduate	89.2		67.0		50.7	72.4
	Master degree	10.2		22.6		14.4	15.7
	PhD	0.6		10.4		34.9	12.0
Occupation	Lecturer	7.1		26.4		40.8	21.9
	Civil servant	8.2		6.4		5.8	7.0
	Private-sector employee	33.5		2.7		2.0	15.1
	Soldier/Police	0.0		5.1		0.0	1.8
	Doing business	3.1		0.0		0.7	1.4
	Housewife	1.8		0.0		0.3	0.8
	Student	40.9		54.3		42.9	46.2
	Not working	3.1		1.3		0.0	1.8

Note: Except for the number of respondents involved in the study, all figures are in percentage.

Source: Calculated from a survey conducted by the authors.

SUPPORT FOR THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

The study measures the support for the AEC and each of its features (free flows of goods and services, free flows of skilled/professional ASEAN workers and the freedom for ASEAN businesspeople to establish companies anywhere in the region (Figure 1).

Regarding the establishment of AEC, most of those surveyed showed their agreement (in general 81 percent supported: 85 percent Malaysians, 83 percent Indonesians and 73 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests, however, showed significant differences in the responses. The post-hoc LSD tests indicated that the support for the ASEAN Community was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 4.00) and Indonesia (mean = 3.96) than in Singapore (mean = 3.81).

I support the establishment of AEC.

ANOVA Tests: $F = 6.07$; $Sig. = 0.00$;
Significant differences exist.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:

- Support in Malaysia and Indonesia are higher than that in Singapore.
- No significant difference between Malaysia and Indonesia.

I support the free flows of goods and services in the region.

ANOVA Tests: $F = 39.41$; $Sig. = 0.00$;
Significant differences exist.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:

- Support in Singapore and Malaysia is higher than that in Indonesia.
- No significant difference between Malaysia and Singapore.

I support the free flows of skilled/professional ASEAN workers in the region.

ANOVA Tests: 1.33 ; $Sig. = 0.27$;
No significant difference.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:


- No significant difference between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.

I support that ASEAN businesspeople should be freely allowed to establish companies anywhere in the region.

ANOVA Tests: 29.79 ; $Sig. = 0.00$;
Significant differences exist.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:

- Support in Singapore and Malaysia is higher than that in Indonesia.
- No significant difference between Malaysia and Singapore.



Source: Calculated from a survey conducted by the authors.

Figure 1: Support for the AEC.

One of the features of AEC is the free flow of goods and services across the region. The study found that almost three-quarters of respondents supported this feature (in general 72 percent supported: 84 percent Malaysians, 58 percent Indonesians and 81 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA and the post-hoc LSD tests indicated that the support was much lower in Indonesia (mean = 3.55) than those in Malaysia (mean = 3.98) and Singapore (mean = 3.95). The level of support in Indonesia which was relatively lower than those from the other two countries (mean = 3.55 with only 58 percent of respondents showing their support) was rather worrying because it is significantly lower than the support in Malaysia and Singapore. Indonesia is the largest country with almost 40 percent of the ASEAN population. Thus, their full-support is needed for the success of the AEC. Without strong support of the Indonesians, the AEC would not be so attractive for businesspeople investing in the region.

Free flow of skilled/professional ASEAN workers across the region is another AEC's feature examined in the study. The survey found that three-quarters of the respondents supported this (in general 74 percent agreed or completely agreed: 73 percent Malaysians, 76 percent Indonesians and 70 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA and the post-hoc LSD tests found no difference in the level of support in the three countries.

Freer flow of investments and businesspeople is a necessary feature for the success of ASEAN economic integration. The study found that most respondents supported this feature (in general 59.03 percent agreed or completely agreed: 67 percent Malaysians, 46 percent Indonesians and 71 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA and the post-hoc LSD tests revealed that the support was much lower in Indonesia (mean = 3.30) than those in Malaysia (mean = 3.71) and Singapore (mean = 3.70).

COMMITMENT TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

Attitude towards the AEC was also measured by the commitment given by the public for goods, investments and workers from ASEAN rather than those from non-ASEAN countries (see Figure 2 below) as it measure their "promise to participate" in the economic community. Regarding goods and services, about 55 percent of the respondents thought that they should choose ASEAN goods or services rather than those from outside ASEAN (68 percent Malaysians, 54 percent Indonesians and 32 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests and the post-hoc LSD tests indicated that the commitment in Malaysia (mean = 3.72) and Indonesia (mean = 3.47) was significantly higher than that in Singapore (mean = 2.91).

When buying goods, we should give priority to goods from ASEAN rather than Non-ASEAN's.

ANOVA Tests: $F = 63.41$; $Sig. = 0.00$; Significant differences exist.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:

- Commitment in Malaysia is higher than that in Indonesia and Singapore.
- Commitment in Indonesians is higher than in Singapore.

Priority should be given to investment and investors from ASEAN countries than to those from countries outside ASEAN.

ANOVA Tests: $F = 39.38$; $Sig. = 0.00$; Significant differences exist.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:


- Commitment in Malaysia is higher than that in Indonesia and Singapore.
- Commitment in Indonesia is higher than that in Singapore.

Priority should be given to skilled/professional workers from ASEAN countries than those from countries outside ASEAN.

ANOVA Tests: 39.27 ; $Sig. = 0.00$; Significant differences exist.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:

- Commitment in Malaysia is higher than that in Indonesia and the Singapore.
- Commitment in Indonesia is higher than that of the Singapore.



Source: Calculated from a survey conducted by the authors.

Figure 2: Commitment to the AEC.

The study also found that more than half of the respondents thought that they should give priority to investments and investors from ASEAN than those from outside ASEAN (in general 54 percent agreed: 66 percent Malaysians, 51 percent Indonesians and 36 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests and the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the commitment in Malaysia (mean = 3.69) and Indonesia (mean = 3.40) was significantly higher than that in Singapore (mean = 3.03).

When the respondents were asked about whether they should give priority to skilled or professional workers from ASEAN rather than those from outside ASEAN, in general 59 percent agreed (68 percent Malaysians, 61 percent Indonesians and 39 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests and the post-hoc LSD tests revealed that the commitment in Malaysia (mean = 3.71) and Indonesia (mean = 3.55) was significantly higher than that in Singapore (mean = 3.06).

Further analysis on the data showed that the commitment of Malaysian public is higher than those in Indonesia and Singapore that two-

thirds of the Malaysian respondents agreed to give priority to goods, investments and workers from ASEAN (68 percent for goods, 66 percent for investments and 68 percent for workers). More than half the Indonesians agreed (54 percent for goods, 51 percent for investments and 61 percent for workers) but the number of those who "neither agree nor disagree" was almost one-third of the total Indonesian respondents (33 percent for goods, 31 percent for investments and 26 percent for workers). On the other hand, only about a third of the Singaporeans agreed to give priority to ASEAN's goods (32 percent), investment from ASEAN countries (36 percent) and ASEAN workers (39 percent).

PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

The third dimension of the study measured the public perception of the benefits received from the AEC. In general, the majority of respondents perceived that the formation of the AEC will be beneficial for their country and the people (see Figure 3).

My country will get benefits from membership in AEC.

ANOVA Tests: $F = 2.46$; $Sig. = 0.09$;
No significant difference.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:

- No significant difference between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.

The formation of AEC is good for the people in my country.

ANOVA Tests: $F = 4.28$; $Sig. = 0.00$;
Significant differences exist.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:


- Perceived benefits in Malaysia and Indonesia are more positive than that in Singapore.
- No significant difference between Malaysia and Indonesia.

The formation of AEC is good/positive for business in my country.

ANOVA Tests: $F = 1.22$; $Sig. = 0.30$;
No significant difference.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:

- No significant difference between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.



Source: Calculated from a survey conducted by the authors.

Figure 3: Perceived benefits of the AEC.

First of all, the study found that most respondents perceived that their countries would benefit from membership in AEC (in general 75 percent

agreed: 78 percent Malaysians, 75 percent Indonesians and 72 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there was no significant difference in the responses in the three countries.

The study also discovered that majority of respondents perceived the AEC as good or positive to the people in their country (in general 81 percent agreed: 84 percent Malaysians, 82 percent Indonesians and 73 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA and the post-hoc LSD tests revealed that the attitude was perception of benefits was higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.97) and Indonesia (mean = 3.96) than in Singapore (mean = 3.82).

Finally, regarding the benefit of AEC to the business in their country, more than three-quarters of the respondents surveyed perceived it as good/positive (in general 76 percent agreed or completely agreed: 77 percent Malaysians, 77 percent Indonesians and 71 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed no significant difference in the responses in the three countries.

The study also measured the respondents' perception of benefits of AEC by asking them about their trust on the benefit of the AEC (See Figure 4). In general, the respondents showed their trusts as shown in their agreement to the indicators. For example, the majority of respondents expressed their trust that AEC would be able to match the economic interests of each ASEAN country (in general 66 percent agreed: 75 percent Malaysians, 70 percent Indonesians and 42 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA and the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the trust was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.86) and Indonesia (mean = 3.76) than in Singapore (mean = 3.26).

Further, almost three-quarters of the respondents expressed their trust that AEC would lead to greater competitiveness to the region (in general 72 percent agreed: 74 percent Malaysians, 75 percent Indonesians and 62 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA and the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the trust was significantly higher in Indonesia (mean = 3.85) and Malaysia (mean = 3.83) than in Singapore (mean = 3.59).

There is often the fear that greater economic integration would be at the advantage of the more developed countries at the expense of the less developed. However, this fear is baseless as the result of the survey showed that about two-thirds of the respondents thought differently: that AEC would bring advantage to both types of countries as it would be able to accelerate the development in the less developed countries as well (in general 67 percent agreed: 70 percent Malaysians, 65 percent Indonesians and 64 percent Singaporeans). ANOVA and the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the belief was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.80) than in Indonesia (mean = 3.71) and in Singapore (mean = 3.61).

AEC will be able to match the economic interests of each ASEAN country.

ANOVA Tests: $F = 48.87$; $Sig. = 0.00$; Significant differences exist.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:

- Trust in Malaysia and Indonesia is higher than that in Singapore.
- No significant difference between Malaysia and Indonesia.

AEC will lead to greater competitiveness to the region.

ANOVA Tests: $F = 10.54$; $Sig. = 0.00$; Significant differences exist.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:


- Trust in Malaysia and Indonesia is higher than that in Singapore.
- No significant difference between Malaysia and Indonesia.

AEC will not only benefit the more developed countries, because it will accelerate the development in the less developed countries.

ANOVA Tests: $F = 5.30$; $Sig. = 0.01$; Significant differences exist.

Post-Hoc LSD Tests result:

- Trust in Malaysia is higher than that in Indonesia and Singapore.
- No significant difference between Indonesia and Singapore.



Source: Calculated from a survey conducted by the authors.

Figure 4: Trust in the benefits of the AEC to the region.

ASPIRATION FOR THE FORMATION OF THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

Finally, the study measured what respondents aspired to include in the AEC. The study obtained some interesting findings (See Figure 5).

First, most respondents (in general 70 percent: 76 percent of Malaysians, 77 percent of Indonesians and 57 percent of Singaporeans) seemed to indicate that the AEC should aspire towards forging regional integration as in the EU. However, careful examination of the responses seemed to indicate that regional integration as in the EU was not the true model they aspired for. For example, there was only little support for the idea of a single ASEAN currency. The idea was rejected by more than half of respondents in Malaysia (54 percent) and by four-fifths of the Singaporean respondents (79 percent). In Indonesia, this idea was supported by 52 percent of respondents; but surely this support would not be enough for the establishment of a single currency regime for ASEAN.

Second, the study conferred an idea of abolishing passport requirements for ASEAN citizens visiting other ASEAN countries and found that it was rejected more than half of those surveyed. Although the idea was favourable to 56 percent of Indonesian respondents, it was rejected by 58 percent of Malaysian and 66 percent of Singaporean respondents.

Thirdly, the study looked for the feasibility of stronger regional governance in ASEAN by asking the respondents' agreement for an ASEAN Parliament, ASEAN Commission, and ASEAN Court of Justice. It is a very interesting finding to discover that these three EU-like government infrastructures were rejected by most Indonesian and Singaporean respondents. The idea of an ASEAN Parliament, for example, was accepted by 62 percent Malaysians but rejected by 60 percent Indonesian and 76 percent Singaporean respondents. The idea of a stronger executive body (like the European Commission in the EU) was accepted by 70 percent Malaysians but rejected by 61 percent Indonesians and 72 percent Singaporean respondents. The idea of an ASEAN Court of Justice (modelled after the European Court of Justice) was accepted by 71 percent Malaysians but rejected by 56 percent Indonesians and 71 percent Singaporean respondents.

Finally, the study asked about the feasibility of abolishing visa for ASEAN citizens visiting ASEAN countries. Currently, citizens of some ASEAN countries are granted visa-free access to most ASEAN countries except to Myanmar. However, this access is different with the free access of EU citizens to all European Economic Area member states (22 EU member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway) and Switzerland which are not only visa-exempt, but are legally entitled to enter and reside in each other's countries. In this case, ASEAN citizens are exempted to visit and remain to the other specific ASEAN countries to a very limited time frame of 14 to 30 days only (See Table 2). To reside and work more than the time frame, specific passes or permits are still required.

The formation of AEC should:

a. be directed towards the establishment of regional integration as in the European Union.

- **Kruskal-Wallis Tests for comparing the responses:** Chi-Square = 36.15; df = 2; Asymp. Sig.= 0.00. Significant differences exist.

- **Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests:** Aspiration is higher in Malaysia and in Indonesia than that in Singapore. No significant difference between Malaysia and Indonesia.

b. include one single currency which valid in all area of ASEAN.

- **Kruskal-Wallis Tests for comparing the responses:** Chi-Square = 66.84; df = 2; Asymp. Sig.= 0.00. Significant differences exist.

- **Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests:** Aspiration is higher in Malaysia and in Indonesia than that in Singapore. No significant difference between Malaysia and Indonesia.

c. include the abolition of passports for ASEAN citizens when visiting other ASEAN countries.

- **Kruskal-Wallis Tests for comparing the responses:** Chi-Square = 36.77; df = 2; Asymp. Sig.= 0.00. Significant differences exist.

- **Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests:** Aspiration in Indonesia is higher than that in Malaysia and Singapore. No significant difference between Malaysia and Singapore.

d. include the ASEAN Parliament which has full authority as a legislative power over the region.

- **Kruskal-Wallis Tests for comparing the responses:** Chi-Square = 103.66; df = 2; Asymp. Sig.= 0.00. Significant differences exist.

- **Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests:** Aspiration in Malaysia is higher than that in Indonesia and Singapore. Aspiration in Indonesia is significantly higher than that in Singapore.

e. include a single executive body (ASEAN Commission) which has full authority as an executive in the region.

- **Kruskal-Wallis Tests for comparing the responses:** Chi-Square = 142.27; df = 2; Asymp. Sig.= 0.00. Significant differences exist.

- **Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests:** Aspiration in Malaysia is higher than that in Indonesia and Singapore. Aspiration in Indonesia is significantly higher than that in Singapore

f. include a single judicial body.


- **Kruskal-Wallis Tests for comparing the responses:** Chi-Square = 127.88; df = 2; Asymp. Sig.= 0.00. Significant differences exist.

- **Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests:** Aspiration in Malaysia is higher than that in Indonesia and Singapore. Aspiration in Indonesia is significantly higher than that in Singapore.

g. include the abolition of visa for ASEAN citizens visiting other ASEAN countries.

- **Kruskal-Wallis Tests for comparing the responses:** Chi-Square = 33.93; df = 2; Asymp. Sig.= 0.00. Significant differences exist.

- **Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests:** Aspiration in Indonesia is higher and in Singapore than that in Malaysia. No significant difference between Singapore and Indonesia.



Source: Calculated from a survey conducted by the authors.

Figure 5: Aspiration for the establishment of AEC.

Table 2: Visa policies of ASEAN states for Southeast Asian citizens.

Access to	Citizens of this country are free to visit and remain for this specific period									
	Brunei	Cambodia	Indonesia	Laos	Malaysia	Myanmar	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand	Vietnam
Brunei ¹	–	Visa required	Free for 14 days	Free for 14 days	Free for 30 days	Visa required	Free for 14 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 14 days	Free for 14 days
Cambodia ²	Visa required	–	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Visa required	Free for 21 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 14 days	Free for 30 days
Indonesia ³	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	–	Visa required	Free for 30 days	Visa required	Free for 30 days			
Laos ⁴	Free for 14 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	–	Free for 30 days	Visa required	Free for 30 days			
Malaysia ⁵	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	–	Visa required	Free for 30 days			
Myanmar ⁶	Visa required	Visa required	Visa required	Visa required	Visa required	–	Visa required	Visa required	Visa required	Visa required
Philippines ⁷	Free for 21 days	Free for 21 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 21 days	Free for 21 days	Free for 21 days	–	Free for 21 days	Free for 21 days	Free for 21 days
Singapore ⁸	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Visa required	Free for 30 days	–	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days
Thailand ⁹	Free for 30 days	Free for 14 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Visa required	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	–	Free for 30 days
Vietnam ¹⁰	Free for 14 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	Visa required	Free for 21 days	Free for 30 days	Free for 30 days	–

Sources: Processed by authors from¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Brunei Darussalam (2013);² Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Kingdom of Cambodia (2013);³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2013);⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2013);⁵ Visit Laos (2013);⁶ Immigration Department of Malaysia (2013);⁷ DoYouNeedVisa (2013);⁸ Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines (2013);⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore (2013);¹⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand (2013);¹⁰ Vietnam Tourism (2013).

On the visa-free issue, the study found a quite interesting finding that two-thirds of the respondents aspired for this feature (in general 66 percent: 55 percent of Malaysians, 73 percent of Indonesians and 68 percent of Singaporeans). Further statistical tests using the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U procedures showed that this expectation is significantly higher in Indonesia and Singapore than in Malaysia.

DISCUSSION

This study seeks to examine public attitudes, opinions and aspirations towards the concept and formation of AEC as these have been shown to matter in community making.

On the AEC, the study found that the attitudes of the respondents in the three countries were positive. Most respondents in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore supported the formation of AEC and its features such as the free flow of goods and services, the free flow of skilled/professional ASEAN workers, and the freedom of ASEAN businesspeople to establish businesses anywhere in the region (See Table 2). However, the extent of support varied by issues. In general, support for the AEC was significantly more positive in Malaysia and Indonesia than in Singapore. There was no significant difference on the issue of free flow of skilled or professional workers, but, on the free flow of goods and services and freedom for businesspeople to operate anywhere in the region, the support of the Indonesians was significantly lower than those of their counterparts in Malaysia and Singapore.

The lack of readiness of Indonesian businesses to compete may explain the Indonesian's lower level of support for free flow of goods and services and freedom for businesspeople to operate anywhere in the region. Indonesia is the most populated country that represents 40 percent of ASEAN population. In terms of economy size, it constituted 39.1 percent of regional market (ASEAN Secretariat 2012). However, the business in the country is perceived to be not ready for the regional competition. A study by Widdi Mugijayani and Pratiwi Kartika (2012) shows that most of Indonesian businesses—especially small and medium enterprises—were pessimistic to face stiff competition resulting from the AEC. Some business associations have voiced their concern for the lack of readiness of Indonesian businesses for the AEC. For example, in December 2012, a top official of the Indonesian Central Bank (Bank Indonesia) described that Indonesian banks are not yet ready to compete head-to-head with their counterparts in Southeast Asia due to the lack of capital and inefficiency in their operations (Alamsyah 2012). In March 2011, it was reported that the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (*Kamar Dagang dan Industri* or Kadin) was worried about Indonesian industry preparation for the 2015 launch of the ASEAN Economic Community (Tarnes and Nababan 2013). In July 2013, the Indonesian Employers Association (*Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia* or Apindo) argued that Indonesia needs to prepare for the AEC in 2015 as there has been no apparent effort from the Indonesian government to prepare for the AEC so far (Chairunnisa

2013). Consequently, the free flow of goods and services and freedom of direct investment are perceived to threaten the survival of national businesses in Indonesia.

The attitudes towards AEC were also measured by the commitment of the respondents to give priority to goods, investments and workers coming from intra-ASEAN than those from non-ASEAN countries. The study revealed some interesting differences (See Figure 1). While the majority of the Malaysians and Indonesians supported the idea of giving priority to ASEAN goods, investments and workers, the support from the Singaporeans was significantly lower. The Singaporean respondents seemed hesitant about giving priorities to ASEAN products, workers and investments. This hesitancy is not positive for the AEC for it is obvious that the support from the ASEAN public for the AEC is related with the optimism that their countries would secure benefits from the formation of AEC. These benefits, however, would be limited if no priority is accorded for ASEAN products, workers, and investments. If the benefits of AEC are perceived to be limited, it is likely to reduce the support of the public from other ASEAN countries.

Singaporeans' hesitancy reminds us of the discussion with respect to the concept of AEC. There are notable differences between the concept of FTA-Plus AEC from Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the concept of "Common Market-Minus Approach" from the ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) during the formulation of the AEC Blueprint (ASEAN Secretariat 2009). The "FTA-Plus" arrangement includes some elements of a common market but does not include the common external tariff (CET) (Guerrero 2008). The non-inclusion of the CET means AEC will allow its members to have different tariffs with non-members. ISEAS's paper has opposed the CET by arguing that, given the different degrees of openness and stages of economic development among ASEAN countries, forming a custom union with CET would be extremely difficult to achieve by the year 2015 (Hew and Soesastro 2003). ISEAS' argument seemed plausible; however, the refusal to give priorities to regional products through a CET would restrict the benefits of economic regional integration in ASEAN.

Regarding perceived benefits of an AEC to their country, people and local businesses (See Figure 3), respondents were highly optimistic. They were optimistic that their countries would benefit from membership in AEC and that greater economic integration would be advantageous for the people and business in their countries. They expected an AEC to enhance competitiveness in the region and to accelerate the development of the less developed countries (See Figure 4). However, the respondents in Indonesia

and Malaysia did not concur with the Singaporeans on the ability of an AEC to match the economic interests or perceived benefits for each ASEAN country: while the majority of the Indonesian and Malaysian were optimistic, the Singaporeans expressed their doubt on this issue. The level of education of Singaporean respondents—almost half of Singaporean respondents possess postgraduate degree (Table 1)—may have influenced their answer. In this case, they stated their dubiety that AEC would be able to match the economic interests of each ASEAN country as they observe that there is no mechanism to do it under this framework.

The study found the consistency in the answers for the indicators of support, perceived benefits and commitment. The responses of the Indonesians and the Malaysians were consistently higher than that of the Singaporeans. As confirmed by the Post-Hoc LSD Tests, the attitudes toward the AEC were significantly more positive in Indonesia and Malaysia than those in Singapore, especially in the level of support and commitment for the AEC. The finding on the consistency between public support and perceived benefits is similar with previous studies on European regionalism. Several scholars including Constantelos and Diven (2010), Gabel (1998), McLaren (2006) and Inglehart (1970) explained how economic utilitarianism plays an important role in determining the support for the EU. Constantelos and Diven (2010) argue that it is rational that the citizens of the EU states weigh the potential benefits against the costs of membership because the primary rationale for integration is the economic gain from integration.

In general, Singaporeans showed lower level of support and commitment to the AEC. The lower level of support and commitment from the Singaporean to the AEC can be explained if we examine the geostrategic factor, demography and economic structure of Singapore. Geostrategically, Singapore is a tiny island surrounded by two much larger countries (Indonesia and Malaysia). The demography of Singapore is different with the two neighbouring countries—Singapore is inhabited by 75.2 percent Chinese population with the Malays making up 13.6 percent (Ho 2010: 193). The tiny landmass of Singapore with poor natural resources made the city-state depends its economy on trade, capital-intensive manufacturing, transportation and communication, financial and business service industries, and biomedical businesses (ibid. 190). These characteristics have made Singapore a pragmatic country and society³; in this case, we argue that these traits may have contributed to the lower level of support and commitment from the Singaporeans to the AEC.

On the aspirations for the formation of AEC, this study also found that the respondents' answers were contradictory (Figure 5). Firstly, they

stated that they aspired for the establishment of regional integration as in the EU. However, further examination found that their concept of integration was, in fact, different from the European integration. Most of the respondents rejected the features of EU: a common currency, the abolition of passports, the establishment of ASEAN Parliament, a stronger executive body, and ASEAN Court of Justice. These contradictions can perhaps be explained by the fact that not many of the respondents may truly understand the concept of European integration.

The findings of the study also suggest that the aspirations for the AEC were different in the three countries. The idea of abolishing passports was supported by many of the Indonesian respondents but rejected by the majority of Malaysian and Singaporean respondents. For example, the chairman of the Association of Indonesian Labour Exporters (*Himpunan Pengusaha Jasa Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia* or Himsataki), Yunus Yamani, in 2011 proposed that Indonesian migrant workers be allowed to use their Indonesian identity card to travel and work in Malaysia because it would save a lot of money (Chew 2011). However, for Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand, the abolition of passports is not likely to be supported due to the threat it would pose to national security. The economies of these four leading Southeast Asian countries are much stronger than the other ASEAN countries, so the abolition of passports would be considered as a threat to the security to these countries as it would be extremely difficult to control labour inflows. Furthermore, the abolition of passports would also make it more difficult to control transnational crimes, human trafficking and terrorism that have plagued these regions in the last 40 years.

The study also found that an EU-like regional government infrastructure such as the Regional Parliament, a stronger regional executive body, and a single judicial body (ASEAN Court of Justice)—while accepted by the Malaysian respondents—were rejected by the Indonesian and Singaporean respondents. It shows that it would be difficult to establish an EU-like regionalism in Southeast Asian as it is not supported by the majority of the public.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can be summed up that the respondents exhibited positive attitudes towards the concept of an AEC, but their aspirations for Southeast Asian regionalism were different from the European integration model. Consequently, effective continuous measurements and strategies are needed

to foster positive attitudes towards ASEAN regional integration. Moreover, as the public opinion may change over time, continuous assessments is needed to assist effective decision making in the region.

This study has found that the public showed positive support and perceived the regional economic integration as positive for them and their country. However, as this study only involved three countries, it should be treated as exploratory. Consequently, the study calls for a more comprehensive study involving the 10 member states of ASEAN. Furthermore, aspirations and attitudes may change over time—or attitudes that are positive today can turn into negative if they are not well-managed. The finding implies that the ASEAN Secretariat—together with national governments—needs to formulate effective strategies to maintain positive attitudes and support for the integration initiatives. To find out the actual aspiration and attitudes of the public of the ten member states, it is suggested that the ASEAN Secretariat or ASEAN Foundation establish an agency to conduct regular "ASEAN barometer" public opinion surveys in the ASEAN countries, so that the decision making for ASEAN Community can be based on the expectations of the people. The survey is considered the best measure because, given the current plurality of political systems of ASEAN countries, it is impossible to conduct direct voting like as in the EU. Without the regular surveys, the real aspirations and attitudes of the public of the 10 member states will remain a mystery, and it will be more difficult to make effective decisions that cater to the needs and wants of the public. Finally, as the deadline of the AEC draws nearer, there are already suggestions for further deepening the integration process beyond the AEC Blueprint as in the proposed Jakarta Framework on "Moving ASEAN Community Forward into 2015 and Beyond" (ERIA 2011) and the ASEAN 2030 study by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADB 2012), making it even more important to continuously gauge the public's opinion through public opinion surveys.

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¹ Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines are the five countries that founded ASEAN on 8 August 1967. On that day, the Foreign Ministers of those five countries attended a meeting in Bangkok and signed the ASEAN Declaration that declares the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation among the Countries of Southeast Asia to be known as ASEAN and spelled out the aims and purposes of that Association (Flores and Abad 1997).

² The statistics from *ASEAN Community in Figures 2011* (ASEAN Secretariat 2012) show that the combined land area of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore is 2,191,322 square kilometres or 49.40 percent of the land mass of ASEAN (total = 4,435,670 square kilometres). The three countries' combined population figure in 2010 is 268.17 million or 44.80 percent of the regional population (total = 598.50 million). The 2010 economic performance of the three countries showed its dominance in the region with

the figure of US\$1,169,896 million in Gross Domestic Product (62.90 percent of total region which is US\$1,858,683 million), 66.30 percent of regional's total trade (US\$1,356,249 million out of US\$2,045,731 million). In total, these three countries attracted 76 percent of foreign direct investments in ASEAN (US\$57,980 million out of US\$76,208 million in 2010).

- ³ Some experts have written Singapore as a pragmatic country with pragmatic values, policies and society. For discussion on this issue, please refer to Ortmann (2009), Vidra (2012), Tan (2012), Mahbubani (2008), and Kam and Gopinathan (1999).

APPENDIX

Survey Question Wording

Variables	Questionnaire	Coding
Support for the AEC	I support the establishment of AEC.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
	I support the free flows of goods and services in the region.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
	I support the free flows of skilled/professional ASEAN workers in the region.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
	I support that ASEAN businesspeople should be freely allowed to establish companies anywhere in the region.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
Commitment to the AEC	When buying goods, we should give priority to goods from ASEAN rather than Non-ASEAN's.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
	Priority should be given to investment and investors from ASEAN countries than to those from countries outside ASEAN.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
	Priority should be given to skilled/professional workers from ASEAN countries than those from countries outside ASEAN.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
Perceived benefits of the AEC	My country will get benefits from membership in AEC.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5

	The formation of AEC is good for the people in my country.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
	The formation of AEC is good/positive for business in my country.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
Trust in the benefits of the AEC to the region	AEC will be able to match the economic interests of each ASEAN country.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
	AEC will lead to greater competitiveness to the region.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
	AEC will not only benefit the more developed countries, because it will accelerate the development in the less developed countries.	Completely disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Not agree nor disagree = 3; Agree = 4; Completely agree = 5
Aspiration for the establishment of AEC	The formation of AEC should be directed towards the establishment of regional integration as in the European Union.	No = 0, Yes = 1
	The formation of AEC should include one single currency which valid in all area of ASEAN.	No = 0, Yes = 1
	The formation of AEC should include the abolition of passports for ASEAN citizens when visiting other ASEAN countries.	No = 0, Yes = 1
	The formation of AEC should include the ASEAN Parliament which has full authority as a legislative power over the region.	No = 0, Yes = 1
	The formation of AEC should include a single executive body (ASEAN Commission) which has full authority as an executive in the region.	No = 0, Yes = 1
	The formation of AEC should include a single judicial body which has full authority as a judicial body in a country.	No = 0, Yes = 1
	The formation of AEC should include the abolition of visa for ASEAN citizens visiting other ASEAN countries.	No = 0, Yes = 1

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