DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND TOURISM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: WHAT HAS THEORY EVER DONE FOR US?

David Harrison*
Middlesex University, London, U.K.
email: davidharrison53@btinternet.com

ABSTRACT

The paper first reviews the current state of development theory. Earlier "paradigms" have been largely superseded. Earlier ideological debates over development "paradigms" have generally been subsumed under broad-based, non-ideological globalisation theory, there is no privileging of internal or external factors in development, and instead there is a general suspicion of grand narratives and a focus on theoretically-informed empirical research. Second, it is argued such perspectives are reflected in theories of tourism development, where there are no over-arching paradigms. "Sustainability" is a worthy and sometimes useful aim, but neither alternative tourism nor sustainable tourism development are models or theories; they cover too many types of tourism and are linked only by being distinct from mass tourism. Third, several propositions are presented as the basis of further reassessment of tourism role in development. It is suggested that capitalism and international tourism will continue for the foreseeable future, that alternative tourism will never replace mass tourism, which will continue to be the norm, and that the former is frequently dependent on the latter for its survival. Furthermore, as international tourism is a cross-border activity linking individuals and institutions across "developing" and "developed" societies, such categorisation is now of little value in conceptualising tourism, which should be seen as operating in an international and systemic way. A global model of tourism political economy is provided, incorporating international, regional and domestic tourism, and the final section of the paper illustrates how tourism in parts of ASEAN can be analysed from within this overall perspective.

Keywords: International tourism, tourism in developing countries, tourism role, political economy, ASEAN tourism
DEVELOPMENT THEORY

There are five sections to this paper. First, the current state of development theory is examined; second, its application to tourism as a tool for development is discussed; and third, several postulates that can be derived from this discussion are raised. This leads to the presentation of a global model of tourism political economy that incorporates both developed and developing societies and an indication of how tourism in parts of ASEAN can be analysed from within this perspective.

Numerous attempts have been made to chart the changing fashions in development theory over the last six decades (Harrison 1988; Mowforth and Munt 2009: 31–46; Sharpley 2009: 29–56; Telfer 2015) but the trajectory outlined by Sharpley is representative of the general consensus. In particular, the period from 1945 to the 1970s has been characterised by Payne and Phillips (2010: 56–84) as the "golden age" of development theory, though the author believes it continued well into the 1980s, when disillusionment really set in (Harrison 1988: 149–183). Irrespective of the exact time frame, though, in the mid-1970s, modernisation theory was the dominant perspective, but it was under consistent attack from underdevelopment (world systems) theory and soon rival advocates were occupying what they saw as radically opposed camps (Table 1).

Table 1: Development Theory from the 1950s (Sharpley 2009: 39).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Development process</th>
<th>Key concepts and strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950s–1960s</td>
<td>Modernisation theory</td>
<td>Dominance of Western economic growth based models:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Stages of growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Structural theories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Diffusion: growth poles and trickle down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• State intervention: regulation/protectionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s–1970s</td>
<td>Modernisation theory/dependency theory</td>
<td>Underdevelopment the result of domination/exploitation by developed countries:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic restructuring, import substitution, protectionism; development of domestic markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Limits to growth: neo-Malthusian theories in response to environmental concerns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continue on next page)
Table 1: (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Development process</th>
<th>Key concepts and strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970–1980s</td>
<td>Neo-liberalism</td>
<td><strong>Promotion of the free market:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Limits on government intervention in economic activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Deregulation/privatisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Structural adjustment programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• New economic order: one world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Neo-liberalism/alternative development</td>
<td><strong>Awareness of effects of development on different cultures/societies:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Grassroots/people-centred development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Basic needs: food, housing, education, health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Local context/indigenous knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Environmental stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Alternative/sustainable development</td>
<td><strong>Dominance of sustainable development paradigm but emergence of post-development school:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Grassroots/people-centred development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Environmental management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Engagement with globalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The development &quot;impasse&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>Beyond the impasse: A new paradigm?</td>
<td><strong>Post-development rejection of overarching development concepts:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Global environmental policies/protocols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Transnational movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Micro-level strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• State security and development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arguably, though, they had much in common. Such commonalities have been extensively rehearsed (Harrison 1988) but they can be summarised and are indicated in Table 2, where their features are presented very much as polar opposites.
Table 2: Modernisation and underdevelopment theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modernisation theory</th>
<th>Underdevelopment theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus analysis on nation state</td>
<td>Focus analysis on global system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing societies are on same route as the West</td>
<td>Undeveloped societies are underdeveloped because of the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development in West was through capitalism and autonomous industrialisation</td>
<td>Underdevelopment occurs through unequal exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing societies can overcome tradition and internal structural constraints.</td>
<td>Tradition does not block under-developed countries (UDCs); rather, they are satellites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They can copy and catch up with the West</td>
<td>or peripheries in a chain of international exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernity characterises entire societies and individuals and involves flexibility,</td>
<td>Internal structures in UDCs reflect western domination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mobility, innovation, entrepreneurship and (usually) capitalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy imperatives: become more like developed countries by associating more with</td>
<td>Political imperatives: break with the capitalist West and their local representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>them</td>
<td>and go it alone or with socialist partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, it is worth emphasising the following:

1. Neither camp really came to conceptual grips with what were (then) intermediate industrialising societies (e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia). In these societies, there were problematic differences in the involvement of the state with "development."

2. Neither had any room for compromise. Either internal structures or external linkages were to blame; either capitalism or socialism was the answer.

3. Both perspectives were Western in origin and both espoused variants of Western models.

4. Both accepted that "development" (in their different terms) was possible. Where they differed most, perhaps, was the means whereby this was to occur.

Even in the 1970s, there were clarion voices suggesting that experiments in untrammelled capitalism and socialism brought anything but development. In 1974, for example, Berger criticised both Brazil and China for sacrificing at least one generation in the cause of capitalism and socialism, respectively. He went on to note: "Both sets of sacrifice are justified by theories. The
theories are delusional and the sacrifices are indefensible. Rejection of both the Brazilian and the Chinese models is the starting point for any morally acceptable development policy" (1974: 14–15).

Certainly, by the end of the 1980s, these over-arching models had been found lacking. The intensity was muted, their advocates less strident, and their mutual exclusivity less emphasised (Harrison 1988: 67–175). To adapt and extend Frank's characteristically pithy critique of modernisation theory, both were increasingly found to be empirically invalid, theoretically inadequate and politically ineffective (Harrison 1988: 78). Arguably, the days of grand theories of development were over.

Nevertheless, there is a strong case for suggesting that elements, at least, of modernisation theory and underdevelopment theory were recycled into neoliberalism and neostatism which, according to Payne and Phillips (2010), emerged from as early as the 1960s, though they really became established only later. The focus of the first, neoliberalism, at its most extreme a version of untrammelled, modernising capitalism, was the emancipating influence of the market in allocating resources, where it was to stimulate industrialisation and development, aided by "good governance" that ensured markets were able to operate freely (Payne and Phillips 2010: 86–98). By contrast, neo-statism, the second movement, was based on the so-called East Asian economic "miracle," and emphasised the role played by the state within the global economy, not simply enabling free trade but actively directing and planning international investment (Payne and Phillips 2010: 98–115).

Like modernisation theory and underdevelopment theory, neoliberalism and neostatism alone are inadequate development models. In the second edition of their important commentary on globalisation, Hirst and Thompson note that while the "naive version of the liberal model is losing credibility... the developmental state model is in little better shape" (1999: 150) and they went on to argue that while there were "no ready-made developmental models," as at least some states had "the capacity to contain markets in the interests of national goals" (Hirst and Thompson 1999: 151). In a later edition, mention of such models has disappeared. Rather, in following what might be described as a "soft" version of globalisation (Hirst, Thompson and Bromley 2009: 9–11), they note en passim the prior requirements of the genuinely modern and competitive nation state for such non-economic features as "a lively, innovative, pluralistic and open aesthetic culture" (129–130) and go on to stress while neoliberalism remains a potent force, the extent it is reflected in international integration depends on how far "the state has played a major role in setting the terms of their engagement as well as managing the social and economic transformations of
the societies concerned" (Hirst et al. 2009: 137). A similar point is made by Lockwood, who argues that whatever the dominant ideology, it is irrelevant and useless if the state itself is not committed to the welfare of its people (Lockwood 2005). Put differently, a world market may indeed be a reality but so, too, are supranational cooperation and state sovereignty.

As disillusionment with modernisation theory and underdevelopment theory was setting in, these economically orientated approaches to development came under pressure from perspectives derived from environmentalism, which can be regarded as a competing quasi-paradigm of development or, rather, anti-development (Redclift 1984 and 1987; Lélé 1991; Harrison 2001: 5–6). Like its competitors, environmentalism relies on western science but, unlike them, focuses on change away from Western (non-)development to a future where, to some extent, the environmental excesses it has caused can be counteracted. We have thus moved from a world economic system, with sometime social and cultural implications, to a truly global system, in which humanity's impact on and relationship with the physical environment has come to occupy centre stage.

Environmentalism challenged neoliberalism (and indeed, any perspective that placed economic growth at the heart of development) in several respects: it raised the vexed issue of how damage to the environment could be measured and reversed, how those responsible could and should be invoiced, and how those who suffered as a result could be compensated (Payne and Phillips 2010: 131–137). At the same time, though, as Payne and Phillips also acknowledge, there is a strong case against environmentalism, in that the concept was elaborated and deployed not as a theoretical contribution to the study of development, but rather as a strikingly loose and accommodating concept which enabled the assertion of the value of integrating environmental concerns into the development agenda (Payne and Phillips 2010: 136).

It is hard to see environmentalism as a specific "paradigm." Its adherents come from a wide range of positions, variously advocating a market approach, a combination with socialism, or a total rejection of Western growth models. It is even more difficult to accord paradigmatic status to recent fashions in development theory. These include such "alternative" development perspectives as basic needs, participation, gender and sustainability, that attained prominence in the 1980s, (Telfer 2002: 37–50), and "postdevelopment," "Human Development" and "Global Development" as emergent paradigms (Telfer 2015), a position similarly adopted by Mowforth and Munt (2009: 33).

Some dimensions of "alternative development" can be dismissed simply because they are inadequately conceptualised. Meeting basic needs,
moving towards gender equality and alleviating poverty are all worthy aims but, in conceptual terms, they are low level projects, achievable via a variety of policies. They certainly do not qualify as development theories, far less paradigms.

By contrast, sustainable development, which might be described as development that is environmentally, socially and culturally sound, has proved more durable. However, this notion, too, is problematic. It is difficult to define (Adams 1990: 57–65; Beckerman 1992: 492; Sharpley 2009: 57–67) and the term itself can be seen as an oxymoron, involving both sustainability and change (Sharpley 2009: 64–65), which will be across economic, social, cultural and ecological dimensions (Tisdell 1993: 216). True, the concept of sustainable development can enable the articulation of specific benchmarks and indicators, but too frequently it remains at the level of rhetoric, and at worst it can be highly ambiguous, a barrier to understanding, and prone to misappropriation, manipulation and "greenwashing" (Harrison 1996; Mowforth and Munt 2009: 177–223; Sharpley 2015; Telfer and Sharpley 2015).

Finally, postdevelopment is a position adopted largely by those who want to say "a plague on all your houses"—especially those constructed by economists (Sharpley 2009: 99–103). Rist, for example, argues that as global resources are finite and social inequalities increasing, models of "development" emphasising economic growth (which really means most of them) have failed. Development, in fact, is the problem and not the solution; economics is an obsolete science, and both should be abandoned. Instead, faith should be placed in localised responses and social movements (Rist 2014: 270–280). His view that postdevelopmentalists need not provide an alternative approach, though, is unconvincing (2014: 274–275), and theorists of postdevelopment have also been generally criticised for ignoring noteworthy developmental successes, for assuming local structures and politics are less unequal than those at national and international levels, for their cultural relativism, including variable commitments to human rights (Sharpley 2009: 102). Rist 2014: 273–277), and as a consequence, for being "so politically inept as to pose no threat whatsoever to extant power structures" (Thornton and Thornton 2008: 10).

At first sight, Easterly (2013) has much in common with post-development theorists. He, too, rejects western economic growth models, claiming they are unsuccessful in their fight against world poverty. In his case, though, it is the way these theories have been implemented—by technocratic "experts" in partnership with dictators—that is the problem and, by contrast with Rist, he focuses not on poverty per se but on human rights:
The technocratic illusion is that poverty results from a shortage of expertise, whereas poverty is really about a shortage of rights. The emphasis on the problem of expertise makes the problem of rights worse. The technical problems of the poor (and the absence of technical solutions for those problems) are a symptom of poverty, not a cause of poverty... The dictator whom the experts expect will accomplish the technical fixes to technical problems is not the solution; he is the problem (Easterly 2013: 7).

Clearly, one can reject mainstream development models for quite different reasons, and posit very different kinds of alternatives. For Rist, the answer is to trust the people and social movements at local level, whereas Easterly's focus is the rights of the individual against the state: "Regardless of which side wins the market-versus-state debate, the state is still able to violate the rights of private individuals with impunity" (Easterly 2013: 11). One might be arguing that trusting people and developing social movements is quite consistent with prioritising human rights, but neither Rist nor Easterly put forward anything resembling a theory or a paradigm. The same might also be said of Isbister, another critic of theories of economic growth. Diagnosing the global situation as one of failed development models, exploitation of non-renewable natural resources with obvious limits to continuing growth, and increased world poverty, he argues developed countries must recognise their interdependence on developing countries, "remove their blinkers and seriously address the problem of world poverty" (Isbister 2001: 237). He may well be correct, but this will not be brought about by adherence to any special theory or paradigm. Rather, it is a moral imperative that somehow needs to be translated into collective international action.

Within current globalisation theory, then, analyses of the importance of internal factors now uniformly co-exist with that of external linkages, and policies followed now rely less on ideological commitment to one or other development models, and more on specific readings of empirical situations and the pursuit of low level projects that can be situated within virtually any over-arching development model or theory. The old paradigms or (better) perspectives remain in the background, subsumed under globalisation theory, but none is dominant and there is a general suspicion of grand narratives. Instead, focus is on theoretically informed empirical research which is aimed at limited objectives rather than the formulation of grandiose statements about the state of the world. "We have not (yet) experienced the death of theory, but its advocates are now more modest and their claims reduced" (Harrison 2014: 146).
THEORIES OF TOURISM DEVELOPMENT

As international tourism increased in importance, the way it has been regarded has changed. Jafari noted some time ago that the warmth of the welcome it has been accorded has vacillated from initial "advocacy" to caution, adaptation and then a more objective "knowledge-based" approach. He noted, too, that such changes were not necessarily in sequence; rather, they tend to co-exist (Jafari 1989: 19–25). And these emotional or ideological approaches were reflected in academic analyses of tourism, which have often attempted to harness and apply development theory, though (it is suggested here) with a degree of only modest success.

How development theory has been applied to tourism has been discussed at length elsewhere (Harrison 2014; Mowforth and Munt 2009; Telfer 2015) and this is no place for a detailed review of the literature. However, while "modern man" has figured as a key feature of tourism studies from the very outset, little academic writing on tourism has explicitly used a modernisation perspective. Exceptions include MacNaught's early defence of tourism in the Pacific (1982), and studies of Chinese tourism by Oakes (1998) and Sofield and Li (1998), while more recently Andriotis (2003) and Sharpley (2001) have considered tourism as a modernising influence in Crete and Cyprus, respectively. Special mention should also be made of Aramberri, who bravely defends mass tourism as a welcome example of modernity (2010).

By contrast, though, modernisation and neoliberal perspectives are implicit in the many debates over tourism's impacts in both developing countries (Telfer 2015) and developed countries. The various roles of indigenous arts and crafts, authenticity, tradition and social structures, entrepreneurship, commoditisation and social change generally, can all be subsumed under the modernisation umbrella (Harrison 2001a: 6–7). Even more importantly, perhaps, a modernisation orientation is also the default mode of thinking for policy-makers throughout the world, even if most are unaware of the quasi-theoretical base on which rests their advocacy of tourism as a means of obtaining foreign investment, economic growth, foreign exchange and tourism employment. Much the same can be said of governments and international agencies that espouse neoliberal principles in promoting the role of the private sector in tourism (Telfer 2015: 48–57), a position consistently followed by such agencies as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Indeed, between 2003 and 2011, ADB provided Southeast Asia US$58.7 million in loan and grant assistance to the GMS (Greater Mekong Subregion) tourism industry (ADB 2012: 11). As indicated elsewhere, the key priorities of the ADB's regional cooperation
strategy and program for the GMS have a strong flavour of neoliberalism, and include making crossborder travel easier, integrating national markets, and developing the private sector (Harrison 2014: 148).

In contrast to the relatively little academic research based specifically on modernisation theory, variants of world systems theory, underdevelopment theory or dependency theory have frequently been the explicit foundation of academic critiques of tourism as a tool for development (Mowforth and Munt 2009: 32–33, 52–60). In essence, the position taken by such critics is that international tourism, especially when it involves developing countries as destinations (but not, one might add, destinations in developed countries) is so structured that developing country destinations are junior and unequal partners. Economically, and perhaps also socially, culturally or politically dependent, they are exploited or "ripped off" by their more developed partners, especially transnational companies, primarily tour operators or hotel groups, who use their bargaining power to cut the junior partner's profits to the bare minimum. In addition, they allegedly drain the developing country of much of the foreign exchange obtained through tourism via repatriated profits, payments for management contracts or franchises, and leakages associated with imports to construct hotels or provide tourists with goods and services that cannot be supplied from the destination's resources.

Analysis of the extent to which developing country destinations have been subjected to these power imbalances is extensive, especially in research carried out in the 1980s (Harrison 2001a: 7), and the work of the "dependency" theorists has been summarised by Telfer (2015: 43–48), who previously also attempted to describe the types of tourism that more or less conform to (what he then saw as) the major development paradigms (2002: 62–78), an effort he seems to have abandoned in the more recent edition (Telfer 2015). By way of illustration, a major and much-quoted advocate of a dependency perspective was Britton, who outlined the overall structure of international tourism more than two decades ago (1982, 1987a, 1987b and 1989). Focusing on Pacific island countries, he followed a classic dependency line in arguing that, when transnational companies were so strongly present, "local elites and foreign interests were the primary beneficiaries of tourism" (1982: 335). His preference was the type of small scale, indigenous-owned tourism found in the "rigid monarchical structure of Tonga," where the Tongan elite "sheltered the country from outside forces" (1982: 349), a view somewhat puzzling in the light of his assertion that Tonga also suffered as a result of not being colonised (1987: 131).

One of several difficulties with Britton's position (and, by extension, other dependency theorists) is that, for no apparent good reason, he
supported local against foreign capital, a stance common among dependistas (Phillips 1977: 19). At first sight, there is no inherent reason to suppose foreign capital is more or less useful (or more or less morally acceptable) than domestic capital. His position is also problematic because the Pacific Island Country (PIC) most apparently "dependent" (in his terms) was Fiji, then and now one of the most "developed" islands in the region, whose tourism has consistently been characterised by a high level of foreign direct investment and is largely dominated by transnational companies which, while far from perfect, pay more, have better training schemes, offer better career prospects than their local counterparts and, in many cases, engage more in corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Harrison and Prasad 2013: 750–755).

Dependency or underdevelopment may have been a preferred academic approach, but it has rarely been taken up by policy makers and governments, though popularised versions of it have been adopted by groups and movements opposed, in particular, to mass tourism. Exceptions can be found, though, in the post-independence histories of Tanzania and the Caribbean. Tanzania was perhaps the country which most attempted to apply dependency theory to domestic and international politics, and attitudes towards international tourism were much conditioned by Nyerere's approach to approach to African socialism, a popular perspective in the early 1970s (Shivji 1973). Tourism was not a major element in the government's strategy of self-reliance: the relatively few hotels that were built were owned and managed by government; tourism infrastructure was not developed, and international investment was discouraged (Wade et al. 2001). It was not until Nyerere resigned that Tanzania was really opened up to capitalist development and since 1985 tourism numbers have increased (Wade et al. 2001: 95); indeed, though some critics (rather unconvincingly) suggest this was more the result of market forces than a changed political ideology (Chambua 2007), arrivals to Tanzania have increased consistently on a year-by-year basis for more than two decades.

With its history of slavery and plantations, the Caribbean has been more sensitive than island societies elsewhere to tourism, which tends to involve white tourists being served by black people (Harrison 2001b: 29–31; Joseph 2005). Revolutionary Cuba led the way and after 1959 international tourism was virtually replaced by social tourism (Hall 1992). For many in the Caribbean, socialist Cuba was a role model, and when other Caribbean islands were rocked by "black power" protests in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Western "development"—in particular, tourism—was branded as imperialistic (Taylor 1975). With popular support, Michael Manley's Jamaica, Mitchell's St. Vincent, and Bishop's Grenada attempted
to reduce dependency on foreign capital and foster much greater degrees of local ownership in tourism (Hayle 2005: 126–133; Mitchell 1989: 177–182). However, because of both endogenous and exogenous factors, such efforts had limited success, and later governments, including that of Castro's Cuba (Spencer 2010) and Manley, in his second term, again sought the support of foreign investors, though academic and non-academic critics of tourism in the Caribbean retain an important voice (Pattullo 1996: 202–211; Strachan 2002: 7–16; Joseph 2005: 171–174; Gmelch 2012: 9–12).

Brief mention should be made of perspectives of "alternative development" and "sustainable development" as they have been applied in tourism. They have been discussed elsewhere (Harrison 2014: 148) but, as indicated earlier, neither are paradigms. Like the concept from which it is derived, alternative tourism development (ATD) is vague and refers to anything which is not mass tourism, sustainable or otherwise, including "nature based" "new," sports, "backpacking" and "pro-poor tourism." Ecotourism, a form of alternative tourism often considered sustainable, is difficult to define (Fennell 1999: 30–64), though in practice governments and aid agencies frequently equate it with small scale and indigenously-run enterprises, irrespective of their environmental impacts, which might be quite negative (Cater 1994: 3–16). Few such enterprises conform to the criteria listed by Honey, which include minimal impact, conservation and support for democracy and human rights (Honey 1999: 22–26), and their environmental and social benefits are usually overestimated (Butler 1999: 12–13; Goodwin 2006: 7).

More broadly, sustainable tourism development is as problematic as alternative tourism. At the conceptual level, it is based on the notion of sustainable development and thus inherits all the vagueness (along with an alleged tendency of reformism) of its underpinning concept, but in addition to this sustainability applied to tourism carries with it problems of its own (Harrison 1996). As defined by Butler, sustainable tourism development is development "that is viable without degrading the human or physical environment or prohibiting successful development elsewhere" (Butler 1999: 12). This is a useful definition, though tourism in many developing countries may, in any case, be the only viable form of development. Other difficulties arise: tourism as an enterprise, for example, may be sustained even if it operates with slash and burn techniques in the course of moving from one destination to another, and it is difficult to measure social and cultural sustainability. If women and young people gain some independence by becoming wage earners, for example, or elements of the economy and culture become commoditised, it is a moot point as to whether or not the social framework or culture have been changed to the extent they have no
longer been sustained (Harrison 1996). And who decides whether or not changes are for the better? In any case, while sustainable tourism/sustainable tourism development are frequently found in tourism development plans, tourism's contribution to sustainability is frequently honoured more in rhetoric than in practice. As Mowforth and Munt note, for example, large and small operators "will increasingly deploy links with conservation, ecology and matters ethical, to their own ends" (2009: 376) and for them, at least, the future of international tourism is likely to be "more of the same" (2009: 377).

A somewhat different position is adapted by Sharpley. Considering sustainable tourism development "a morally desirable but fundamentally idealistic and impractical alternative" (2009: 77), and thus generally unworkable, he suggests the appropriate response is to focus more specifically and more locally on "destination capitals," where tourism's benefits are optimised "within locally determined environmental parameters" (2009: 198). Put another way, local stakeholders together determine the terms in which tourism's benefits can be brought to the destination capital and exert control over their own local situation. This is an acceptable proposition. It is not grand theory, a model, or a paradigm, but as a policy imperative it might work.

In summary, while sustainability is clearly a worthy aim, and can lead to useful environmental, economic and sociocultural benchmarks, neither alternative tourism development nor sustainable tourism development are models or theories, and to award them the status of paradigms, at least in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn 1970) is mistaken. Even accepting Kuhn's own vagueness—seeing them alternatively as the entire spectrum of beliefs of a scientific community or, by contrast, a more limited "disciplinary matrix with associated 'exemplars'" (Harrison 1988: 162–164), they simply cover too many types of tourism, are too vague conceptually, and the required principles of sustainability have rarely been implemented politically. Indeed, the only features all these types of tourism have in common is, first, they are not mass tourism and, secondly, they will never replace it (Aramberri 2010: 311–352).

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? SOME PROPOSITIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

So far, it has been suggested that the days of grand theories of development have passed. Modernisation theory, underdevelopment theory, neoliberalism and neostatism, along with environmentalism and sustainable development,
have all been found wanting. They continue to co-exist, within globalisation theory, but none dominate current development thinking, and for some time attention has been focused on lower level aims and objectives, for example, poverty alleviation, gender equality and basic needs.

The realisation of the inadequacies of grand theories of development—or the loss of faith in them, which is not quite the same—is reflected in current approaches to tourism. None have taken root in analyses of international tourism, though modernisation perspectives remain the default approach, at least implicitly, both for economists and others committed to continued economic growth and policy makers who still regard tourism as some kind of passport to development (de Kadt 1979). By contrast, in outposts of socialism, often within academia, tourism continues to be viewed through the lens of dependency/underdevelopment theory, the perspective of choice for those who oppose both capitalism and mass tourism.

If these conclusions are correct, it is time for tourism academics (and all those committed to using tourism as a tool for development) to rethink the current position and reflect on the future of academic studies of tourism, much of which—at least implicitly—fits into a "tourism as development" framework. At a personal level, this is especially necessary, as the author has followed these debates, and made some contributions to them, over the last three decades. Doubtless there are alternative ways forward, but—for this researcher, at least—they must be based on several basic assumptions, which can be presented as a series of propositions.

**Capitalism and International Tourism Will Continue for the Foreseeable Future**

Those who study and carry out research on international tourism need to be realistic. We must assume that international tourism will continue to expand. In addition, irrespective of our own ideologies, it is equally necessary to accept that virtually all tourism is going to be promoted through *some form or another* of capitalism. The precise *type* of capitalism involved will vary, and there is plenty from which to choose: state-guided capitalism, oligarchic capitalism, big-firm capitalism or entrepreneurial capitalism, or we might refer instead to classical capitalism, corporate capitalism, market-oriented corporate capitalism, bank-oriented corporate capitalism or state capitalism. More simplistically still, we can categorise capitalism according to its historical variants in, for example, Britain, Germany, Sweden, Japan, France or China (Screpanti 2001; Crouch 2005). Irrespective of which labels we use, however, the issue is how capitalism
and tourism are related, what forms tourism takes in different periods and regions, and how they change over time.

**Large-scale Tourism Will Continue to be the Norm**

Almost since the academic studies of tourism started, many academics have been either implicitly or (quite often) explicitly hostile to mass tourism. And to mass tourists. This may be for several reasons, but one must surely be the similarity of some academic research, especially social anthropology and sociology, to tourism. Indeed, residents in destination areas often consider social scientists to be tourists. Whether for this reason, related factors of social class, or just downright snobbery, academics have consistently distanced themselves from tourists; to adapt Waterhouse, "I'm a social scientist, my friends are travellers, you're a tourist and he's a tripper."

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, studies of mass tourists are few compared to those on "sustainable" tourism or ecotourism. Here, a short anecdote might be instructive: in June 2009, the International Academy for the Study of Tourism was held at a hotel in Magaluf, Mallorca, a Balearic island epitomising modern mass tourism. Numerous erudite papers were presented, and discussions were undeniably learned; however, despite the fact that, within a few minutes' walk of the hotel, high-season mass tourism was on display (and, after dark, at its most manifestly drunken), no-one talked about it and very few made the effort to go and see what was happening.

There are exceptions: they include spirited defences of mass tourism by Butcher (2003) and Aramberri (2010), studies of the British in Spain (Andrews 2011; O'Reilly 2000), of tourists visiting European destinations (Boissevain 1996), or Cyprus (Sharpley 2001) and winter tourism in Austria (McGibbon 2000). Notably, most of these are anthropological studies, usually of destinations in developed societies. By contrast, studies of large-scale tourism in developing societies are almost non-existent.

At the conceptual level, too, albeit with exceptions (Butler 1992: 44 and 1999: 12), there has been a reluctance to face up to mass tourism, which has been a veritable elephant in the university lecture hall. Nevertheless, recent indications are that this myopia is being reduced. Weaver, who has consistently allowed for the possibility that mass tourism can and should be sustainable (2001: 167–168), has more recently led a debate (in Singh 2012) as to whether or not there is a "paradigm shift" towards sustainable mass tourism (Weaver 2012), and the same edited collection includes a similar debate on whether or not "small" tourism is "beautiful" (Harrison 2012). Such developments, while promising, are but the beginning of what needs to be a thorough reorientation to mass tourism in both developing and
developed societies. Such an effort would be long overdue. Mass tourism dates back to the mid-nineteenth century and, in many respects, the processes through which it then occurred in developed societies are currently being repeated in developing societies. "In short, now as then, tourism is considered a tool for 'development'" (Harrison 2001a: 5).

**Alternative Tourism is Normally Linked to and Often Dependent on Mass Tourism and Will Never Replace It**

Reading some descriptions of alternative tourism, it is easy to gain the impression it is quite distinct from mass tourism—an alternative paradigm that can be adopted as a politically correct alternative to unsustainable mass tourism. That impression is wrong. First, most "alternative tourism" is as capitalistic as mass tourism and, depending on definitions, might often be a variant of mass tourism. The Association of Independent Tour Operators (AITO), for example, in the U.K., an organisation representing more than 100 relatively small companies, specialises in a wide range of holidays, including those based on sun, sea and sand, adventure, culture, or short city breaks (http://www.aito.com/aito-members). Such companies exist to make a profit—if they did not, they would fail—and frequently take tourists to places where (other) mass tourists go.

Indeed, the close links of alternative tourism to mass tourism are evident in the organisation of the tourism industry, and many small, formerly independent and specialist companies are now part of much bigger organisations. Tui, for example, the German-based transnational tourism company, owns about 100 brands, including First Choice and Thomson—both heavily involved in mass sun-sea-and-sand holidays—and numerous smaller, formerly independent tour operators, that make up its "specialist holidays" section. These include Exodus, a British outbound tour operator, founded in 1974, a highly reputable small-scale company offering a high quality, "responsible" adventure tourism product (http://www.exodus.co.uk/about-exodus).

Second, as Weaver has noted, much small-scale tourism—in his terms, circumstantial alternative tourism (CAT)—remains small in scale only as a result of "pre-development dynamics, and not as a consequence of deliberate planning decisions and management decisions" (2001: 164). Conditions for it to become bigger have not yet occurred. A similar point was made more than two decades ago by Butler (1992: 46), who also notes that, because of the intensity of interaction arising from small-scale tourism, its impacts might be more damaging to local cultures than mass tourism,
where interaction between resident and tourist is less intense (Butler 1992: 43).

Third, much alternative tourism not only supplements mass tourism (Butler 1992: 44) but is dependent upon it. In Fiji, for example, where the author worked for several years, much "ecotourism" (often seen as synonymous with small-scale, locally-run tourism) survives only because it feeds off conventional tourism, providing village visits, nature walks and local tours to guests staying at the larger, foreign-run hotels. In turn, conventional tourism benefits because these local activities are added attractions and encourage visitors to stay longer.

Finally, it seems obvious that small-scale versions of alternative tourism will never replace mass tourism! It is highly unlikely numbers of international tourists will fall dramatically (just the reverse) and the notion that it would be preferable for all tourists currently enjoying facilities in large hotels, for example, to be spread equally and more thinly across a wider area (with the loss of all the economies of scale in meeting their basic needs and providing essential utilities) is, quite simply, irrational.

In short, seeing alternative tourism, itself a vague concept, as totally distinct from mass tourism is mistaken. Different forms of tourism that are not, currently, mass tourism can still have problematic impacts, may themselves lead to forms of mass tourism and, in any case, may depend upon and/or complement mass tourism.

**International Tourism is a Cross-border Activity Linking Individuals and Institutions in Developed and Developing Societies and Needs to be Conceptualised as Operating in an International and Systemic Way**

It is now commonplace to argue that we live in a globalising world, though debates centre on the varying importance of economic, cultural and political dimensions (Waters 1995: 158–164), the extent to which local processes, local institutions and nation states are able to counter the trend (Hirst et al. 2009: 1–21) and, more broadly, how far globalisation itself needs to be explained. As Hay and Marsh note:

"For, in so far as globalization can be identified, it is understood as the contingent (and only ever tendential) outcome of a confluence of specific processes that are themselves likely to be limited in space and time. Globalized outcomes and effects might then be the product of very different, indeed entirely independent, mechanisms and processes of causation that can
only be obscured by appeal to a generic (and causal logic) of globalization (2000: 6).

In such circumstances, it is no longer appropriate to focus on "development," or to use a more neutral term, social change, only in relation to developing societies. In the context of modern trading patterns, including international tourism, this makes no sense. Regions within the "developed" world are equally avid in seeking to increase tourist arrivals, the operation of many of the institutions involved, for example, transnational companies, criss-cross national boundaries, and the processes through which they operate are similar (or at least, comparable) wherever they occur, involving both global processes and local reactions. To take the well-known case of the tourism destination area cycle, the patterns of the rise (and fall) of their tourism sectors have been compared across numerous developed and developing societies, including the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, Spain, Denmark, Portugal, China, Thailand, the Caribbean, Hawai‘i and other Pacific island countries, and Southern Africa (Butler 1980; Lagiewski 2006). In any case, it is virtually impossible to understand how tourism operates in—and impacts on—developing societies without seeing how developing country tourism is linked to the global system.

Indeed, sharply distinguishing one region, society or nation state from another (for example, "developing" and "developed" societies) may work more to disguise the similarities than clarify the differences, and processes and institutions in both need to be researched. Examining those in one kind of society (even if they can be clearly distinguished) is to view only one part of the picture. At the very least, they are likely to be linked in some ways, and sometimes the links are direct and evident. The emergence of mass tourism in U.K. seaside resorts in the mid-nineteenth century, for example, drew very similar criticisms to those voiced in the twentieth century about emerging resorts in developing societies. The processes were similar (and yet have rarely been compared). In addition, in the 1950s, when surplus aircraft from the second World War came to be used in establishing large-scale tourism from the U.K. to the European Mediterranean, a middle class with increasing disposable income rapidly forsook British resorts, and all the uncertainties of the British weather, for summer sun, sea, sand (and sometimes Sangria) elsewhere. As the warm Mediterranean resorts thrived, those in the chilly U.K. declined, and many of the latter continue to receive development funds from the European Union.

Elsewhere (Harrison 2014: 151), the author has advocated a globalisation perspective that incorporates the kind of tourism political economy proposed by Bianchi, where the key focus is on "the systemic
sources of power which both reflect and constitute the competition for resources and the manipulation of scarcity, in the context of converting people, places and histories into objects of tourism consumption" (Bianchi 2000: 268). Such an approach, emphasising the role of transnational tourism corporations, and yet also according a role for the state, is a variant of international political economy, and brings together elements of neoliberalism, economic nationalism and Marxism, focusing on the market and the state and all the various class and other forces that mediate their relations. However, there is more to the operation of international tourism than economic processes, national and international institutions, and power struggles over the access to scarce resources (though these are clearly important). And disciplines other than economics, international relations and sociology are relevant to the study of how this international tourism system operates, grounded as it is within the global economy.

TOWARDS A WORKING MODEL OF TOURISM

Figure 1 presents what the author has described as a "working model" of international tourism. The focal points in the model are, first, the social, political and economic structures of the societies that provide and receive tourists, and the role and structure of the tourist in these societies.

Second, the nature of these societies will affect, and be affected by, the emergence of tourism, the motivations of tourists, and the various types of tourism that emerge from their demand and the ways it is satisfied by the supply of hospitality, facilities and attractions in destination societies. All such developments are, in turn, reflected in tourism's economic and other impacts in destination societies, including the interaction of different kinds of tourist with different types of resident.

While the model is somewhat crude and broad, it is illustrative of where research, from a variety of disciplinary standpoints, can focus. It is applicable to both small-scale and mass tourism, and can assist analysis of domestic, regional or international tourism. In addition, it highlights the linkages across societal and state borders and yet nevertheless incorporates the role of internal social and economic structures. In essence, the model indicates what seem to be the most important linkages and, as a consequence, provides a framework within which questions (across a wide range of disciplines) can be framed and theoretical concepts developed. It does not, in itself, imply the nature of the links, or have any implication of the strength of one link against another.
Figure 1: A working model of (domestic, regional and international) tourism (Harrison 2010: 42).
EXAMPLES FROM THE ASEAN CONTEXT

By way of illustration, links across the international tourism system are indicated in Table 3, which lists exogenous and endogenous factors that might reasonably be considered to have affected the development of tourism in the ASEAN region.

Exogenous factors may be of two types: global and regional. Those that are global have knock-on effects not only in the ASEAN region, but also elsewhere and will include environmental, economic and cultural features. Examples of environmental factors include long-term global warming and short-term changes in weather patterns (e.g., El Nino), while major global economic changes include the post-world-War II economic development in Western Europe and North America, along with technological change in aircraft manufacture, which together fuelled massive increases in outbound tourism in the 1960s and 1970s. By contrast, cultural features include the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, attitudes to sun tanning and beauty, the images held of destination communities and societies, the timing and regularity of school holidays and factory closures, and the acceptance or otherwise of such practices as gambling, drinking and sexual freedom. Clearly, too, health scares in one country or region (e.g., SARS and Avian Influenza from East Asia, or the Ebola epidemic in West Africa), have had widespread ramifications elsewhere, as has domestic unrest and international warfare, especially the American/Vietnamese War. From a different perspective, all such examples illustrate how factors in one area affect the complex interaction between what might be described as source country "push" and destination "pull," a situation invariably exacerbated by state policies and marketing campaigns that are local responses to global trends and events.

The line between global exogenous factors and regional factors is somewhat blurred. As with the 1960s expansion of the European economy, the growth of the Chinese economy, and the ensuing middle class with disposal income and permission to travel overseas, has had global ramifications but it has especially benefitted ASEAN countries. Specific events, too, may be influential. In 2014, for instance, the destruction of MH17 aircraft over the Ukraine demonstrates how war in one region had tragic personal and collective effects in Southeast and East Asia, while the earlier loss of MH370 indicates how a disaster in one country may have global ramifications (a possibility reinforced by the loss of QZ8501 on 28 December 2014).
Table 3: Examples of exogenous and endogenous factors in tourism, with special reference to ASEAN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous Factors</th>
<th>Response and Related Endogenous Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Changes in fashion and attitudes to sun tan and health in Europe in 1920s.</td>
<td>New resort attractions developed in countries with plenty of sun, sea and sand. Holiday seasons are established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Standardisation of school/national holidays in tourist-sending societies.</td>
<td>Along with climate, reinforces seasonality at destinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Global warming and climate change El Nino weather patterns.</td>
<td>Hot summers in sending societies may reduce outbound tourism and increase staycations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Post 1945, surplus aircraft and more disposable income in West lead to search for sun elsewhere, first short haul and then long haul.</td>
<td>1960s: Rise of new resorts in Mediterranean Europe and Greece, and later elsewhere. Simultaneous decline in many European seaside resorts, some of which are now development areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Colonialism and language of colonialists.</td>
<td>Articulates with pre-tourism social structures (social class, status, ethnicity etc.), e.g., &quot;plural society&quot; of Malaysia, Crown/Chinese/TNC partnerships in Thailand. Affects who invests in tourism and character of destination, e.g., Portuguese in Macau, British in Hong Kong. Attraction of destination affected by language, commitment to colonial heritage and adherence to colonial image. Marketing may be linked to stereotype.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Civil and regional wars, e.g., American/Vietnamese War (1950s–1975), Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), Sino-Japanese wars (1890s and 1937–1945.</td>
<td>Numerous knock-on effects, e.g.: a) Later reluctance to visit territories of former combatants; b) Thailand as R&amp;R area for U.S. military and emergence of large-scale sex tourism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 State policies towards inbound and outbound tourism.</td>
<td>Exogenous and endogenous factors, e.g., earlier controls on outbound tourism by Japan and China, and on inbound tourism by China, Lao PDR and Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continue on next page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous Factors</th>
<th>Response and Related Endogenous Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 Rapid economic growth (e.g., China), rise of middle class and overseas travel.</td>
<td>Changes nature of tourism in destination countries, with general problem of cultural differences across tourist/resident divide (including mainland and SAR Chinese).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Changing class structures in sending societies lead to changing motivations and</td>
<td>Destination areas respond to new demand with marketing campaigns, new kinds of attractions, niche markets (ecotourism, adventure tourism), e.g., hedonistic &quot;party centres,&quot; e.g., Vang Vieng, Lao PDR and Bali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>types of outbound tourists, and new &quot;push factors.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Economic activities in adjacent societies, e.g., slash and burn agriculture in</td>
<td>Environmental pollution, reduced tourist numbers, e.g., in Malaysia and Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 State legislation, e.g., illegality of gambling in China.</td>
<td>Establishment of casino tourism in adjacent countries, e.g., Hong Kong and Macau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Global Financial Crisis 2007f.</td>
<td>Little impact in ASEAN? Reduced arrivals from Europe and N. America but protected by resilience of Chinese market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Health crises elsewhere, e.g., Ebola in West Africa.</td>
<td>Possibility of more border controls. SARS and Avian influenza in 2003 were endogenous to ASEAN with major tourism impacts regionally and internationally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Global spread of Islamic fundamentalism.</td>
<td>Reflected in Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005. Impacts on destination image, reduced arrivals, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Increased prosperity in sending societies.</td>
<td>Differences in ease of &quot;doing business&quot; in destination areas arising from government policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Cheaper air travel.</td>
<td>An additional &quot;push factor&quot; sometimes leading to second/retirement homes, provided they are facilitated by government policy (e.g., visas) in destination areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Other publicity from outside, e.g., feature films (&quot;Lost in Thailand&quot;).</td>
<td>Can be positive or negative: this film led to increased numbers of Chinese visitors. Domestic unrest has opposite effect, perhaps benefiting neighbouring countries (or destinations outside the region).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Special mention has to be made, too, of the linked histories arising from colonialism and global trading patterns and their knock-on effects in both tourist-sending and tourist-receiving communities and societies. These include language, a major consideration in the choice of holiday destinations, and the socio-economic structures and cultures inherited from colonialism by the former colonies, along with colonial architecture, once seen as a relic of a bygone age but, more recently (and often too late) a valuable example of "heritage." In many destinations, for example, where a capitalist class has pre-existed tourism, those with financial capital have often been first in line to invest, especially where they have also possessed social and cultural capital. Other factors are also important though: in the Caribbean such a capitalist class did exist and was able to invest in tourism, though the welcome given to visitors is still clouded by the common association of tourism with slavery. By contrast, in the South Pacific, which was colonised for a shorter period, tourists receive a more open welcome but indigenous people did not possess financial, social or cultural capital, so from the outset tourism was largely run by people of European origin, a situation which continues to this day (Harrison 2001b: 30–31).

A further link of tourism processes across different types of society is seen in the crucial role of land ownership at the time tourism commences. Even in one destination, the resort of Blackpool, in the U.K. that "took off" in the mid-nineteenth century, the type of tourism varied across the town according whether land ownership was diffused or concentrated (Walton 1978: 62–64). Similarly, 150 years later, investment in tourism development in Pacific islands has been crucially affected by the communal ownership of land (Commonwealth of Australia 2008).

Numerous other examples of the internationalisation of tourism, and the need to situate tourism development in a global context, can be seen in Table 3, and many more could be added. However, the overall issue is clear. Tourism has occurred, and continues to occur, in "developed" and "developing" societies: the processes and impacts are comparable, and studying it in isolation ensures that, at best, only a partial picture will ever be visible. It is no longer acceptable to consider "development" a feature of only what used to be called "The Third World." That disappeared when the Second World imploded. We live now in one world, in which globalising tendencies are consistently and continually countered by local responses, and tourism is both a cause and an effect of these tendencies. As a consequence, we need to view social change through a wide lens. Do we still call it "development"? As always, that is a value judgement. Like beauty, progress is in the eye of the beholder.
NOTES

A sociologist/anthropologist of development, David Harrison is Professor of Tourism at Middlesex University, London and is especially interested in tourism's impacts in islands and small states. He was previously Head of the School of Tourism and Hospitality Management at the University of the South Pacific, Fiji and before then held positions at London Metropolitan University and the University of Sussex in the U.K. David has researched and written about tourism's impacts in Eastern Europe, Southern Africa, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia and most recently, in Pacific Islands. He is author of *The Sociology of Modernization and Development* (1988), many peer-reviewed articles, and editor and co-editor of numerous books on tourism, including *Tourism and the Less Developed Countries* (1992) and *Tourism and the Less Developed World* (2001). Most recently, with Stephen Pratt, he co-edited *Tourism in Pacific Islands* (2015). He is currently focusing on the international linkages brought about by mass tourism.

1 This is evident in almost any text on globalisation, but Hirst et al. (2009) and O'Meara, Mehlinger and Krain (2000) provide two good examples.

2 There is an extensive literature on the history of tourism destinations but it tends to focus on destinations in Europe and North America. Contributors to Walton (2005), for example, present a range of hugely informative case studies, but they are mainly in Europe and there are no examples from what would now be considered developing societies. One merit of a global perspective on international tourism would be to bring historians of tourism together and reduce the current level of what might be described as a form of intellectual apartheid.

3 International Political Economy is a relatively new approach, said to combine the disciplines of Economics and International Relations. For Paul and Amawi, it is based on the "holy troika" of liberalism, economic nationalism and Marxism (2013: 27). Frieden and Martin see it as encompassing "all work for which international economic factors are an important cause or consequence" (2003: 118), including the domestic and international politics of trade and exchange rates, and impacts at national level of international flows of goods and capital. Cohen suggests it is comprised of two quite distinct traditions, the American school, which is state-centric, and the British school which is wider focused, more eclectic, and which "treats the state as just one agent among many, if states are to be included at all" (Cohen, 2008: 175).

REFERENCES


